A propositional temporal logic is brie y introduced and its use for reactive systems speci cation is motivated and illustrated. G-automata are proposed as a new operational semantics domain designed to cope with fairness/liveness properties. G-automata are a class of labelled transition systems with an additional structure of goal achievement which forces the eventual ful lment of every pending goal. An algorithm is then presented, that takes a nite system speci cation as input and that, by a stepwise tableaux analysis method, builds up a canonical G-automaton matching the speci cation. Eventuality formulae correspond to goals of the automaton their satisfaction being thus assured. The direct execution of G-automata, and consequently of speci cations, is then discussed and suggested as an alternative approach to the execution of propositional temporal logic. A short overview of the advantages of applying the techniques to the speci c eld of database monitoring is presented.
Introduction
The use of temporal logic has been widely explored both on the elds of speci cation and certi cation of properties of reactive systems (Pnueli, 1977) , (Sernadas, 1980) , (Fiadeiro and Maibaum, 1992) , (Clarke, Grumberg and Kurshan, 1992) , (Manna and Pnueli, 1992) , (Manna and Pnueli, 1993) , (Sernadas, Sernadas and Costa, 1995) , (Sernadas, Sernadas and Ramos, 1996) and in monitoring (H ulsmann and Saake, 1991) , (Kung, 1984) , (Lipeck and Saake, 1987) , (Schwiderski, Hartmann and Saake, 1994) . The advantages are known to lie on the clear declarative formalization of the system at hand and on the use of temporal veri cation techniques to prove properties of the speci ed systems. Temporal logic speci cation has also given an important contribution towards the establishment of suitable compositional speci cation frameworks (Barringer, Kuiper and Pnueli, 1984) .
We address the subject of connecting temporal speci cation with an operational semantic domain build around the notion of labelled transition system. The problem, identi ed in (Sernadas, Costa and Sernadas, 1994) and rst dealt with in (Caleiro, 1993) , resides on establishing a canonical operational semantics of temporal speci cations, and consequently on nding a notion of labelled transition system which copes well with liveness and fairness issues. Moreover, the results obtained in (Sernadas, Sernadas and Caleiro, 1996) concerning denotational semantics also stressed the need for providing an adequate operational counterpart. For the purpose, and restricting our attention to propositional temporal logic, we present G-automata, which are labelled transition systems with stuttering, additionally equipped with a structure of goals whose intention is to restrict acceptance. These are closely related to assuming fairness assumptions on the execution of transition systems (Manna and Pnueli, 1992) , (Manna and Pnueli, 1993) but use an approach somehow similar to the acceptance structure of other, well known, de nitions of automata on in nite computations such as those of B uchi, Muller or Streett automata (Thomas, 1990) or variants of these, eg. 8-automata (Manna and Pnueli, 1987) .
However, G-automata arise, in our opinion, much more naturally, while still emulating their expressive power. Mainly due to the fact that they explore transitions rather than states to formulate the acceptance condition on computations, which seems much more natural since the performance of transitions is the only way a system may evolve in order to satisfy some commitment. Using such a semantic domain we manage to ll in the gap between speci cation and operational semantics. We provide a constructive method to obtain the operational semantics of a system speci cation by means of a tableaux-like method based on the decision procedure for propositional temporal logic satis ability described in (Ben-Ari, Pnueli and Manna, 1983 ). The approach is therefore similar to the \traditional" methods for synthesizing models from temporal speci cations (Clarke and Emerson, 1981) , (Manna and Wolper, 1984) , (Pnueli and Rosner, 1988) . However, we do not just choose a computation meeting the speci cation as in (Manna and Wolper, 1984) but we manage to build a G-automaton which generates all of its models. Note that fairness or liveness properties can be speci ed, having an operational counterpart re ected on the acceptance condition of the obtained automaton.
The direct execution of the speci cations can therefore be discussed in the context of possible strategies for implementing G-automata features. We therefore expect to give a contribution to the eld of executable temporal logics (Fisher and Owens, 1995) . Although the logic we present has some useful speci c features such as a clear distinction between state variables, action occurrence and action enabling (Sernadas, Sernadas and Costa, 1995) , our main concern is not to propose a new temporal programming language but rather suggest a di erent way of implementing the execution of temporal logic statements based upon the operational model introduced. We compare with related work and point out how the results can be useful, namely in database monitoring applications (Kung, 1984) , (Lipeck and Saake, 1987) . We end up with an outlook of possible developments of the proposed techniques.
Through the paper, we assume that the reader is conversant with the eld of temporal logic speci cation, for instance at the level of (Emerson, 1990) , (Goldblatt, 1987) , and with fairness and liveness issues (Francez, 1986) , (Gabbay, Pnueli, Shelah and Stavi, 1980) .
In section 2 we introduce and illustrate the use of temporal logic in systems specication. The temporal language is de ned and several kinds of speci able properties are mentioned. The fundamental aspect of the logic is its ability to distinguish between occurrence and enabling of an action. Section 3 is devoted to a full description of the class of automata we propose. We pay close attention to the structure of pending goals and corresponding ful lment associated with each automaton. Parallel composition is studied as an example of the degree of compositionality obtainable on such a domain. We also de ne the satisfaction relation between G-automata and the formulae of the adopted speci cation logic. The core section of the paper is the fourth. It is where the method of synthesis of a G-automaton from a given system speci cation is described. A tableaux calculus for the logic at hand is introduced and used as a way of reasoning about \next state". Section 5 is dedicated to outlining strategies for directly executing speci cations via the implementation of the synthesized G-automata. We also compare the techniques with other existing approaches to executing propositional temporal logic speci cations. At last, section 6 discusses the results obtained, their connection with previous work and applications to monitoring. It also outlooks possible extensions to this work.
Temporal speci cation of reactive systems
We consider a reactive system to be some entity able to sequentially perform actions. Between action occurrences some local state is reached and may be observed by associating boolean values to it. One of the most important observable properties of a state is its action menu, that is those actions whose occurrence is possible. Therefore, as in (Sernadas, Costa and Sernadas, 1994) , we consider a system speci cation to be a description of its actions and observations as well as of the enabling conditions of actions and of the e ects of each occurrence on observations. This corresponds to restricting the possible combinations of action occurrences and observations allowed by the alphabet.
We start by shortly introducing the envisaged speci cation logic.
The specification logic
The speci cation logic we use, a simpli ed version of OSL (Object Speci cation Logic) (Sernadas, Sernadas and Costa, 1995) , is a propositional multilinear temporal logic. Multilinear in the exact sense that it distinguishes action occurrence from action enabling (Sernadas, Sernadas and Caleiro, 1996) . So, if a is some action (or prime action, as we shall name it), ra stands for \a occurs" and a for \a is enabled to occur". Definition 2.1. (Signature) A signature is a pair = ( obs ; act ) of sets, to whose elements we call, respectively, observation symbols and prime action symbols. Now, we de ne the envisaged temporal language over a given signature. For the purpose, throughout the remaining of the subsection, we consider xed a signature . The set of atoms over is Atom = fb : b 2 obs g fra : a 2 act g f a : a 2 act g. (: '); (' ) ); (X '); (' U ) 2 Form if '; 2 Form .
As usual, the temporal language can be extended with some useful abbreviations:
abv (:(G(: '))).
We introduced four temporal operators. The \next" operator (X) refers, as usual, to the following instant. The \until" operator (U) we adopt is weak and includes the evaluating point. The derived ones have the usual meanings, namely, \henceforth" for (G) and \eventually" for (F). Both include the evaluating point.
In order to de ne the satisfaction of formulae we consider life-structures as sets of linear life-cycles. A life-cycle consists, therefore, in a sequence of sets of atoms, where every occurring prime action must be enabled. To such sets of atoms we call snapshots. Consequently, we also require that enabling corresponds to possible execution in an alternative life-cycle of the life-structure. A snapshot over is a set snp Atom such that if for some a 2 act , ra 2 snp then also a 2 snp. We denote by Snp the set of all snapshots over . For each snp 2 Snp we denote by snp n r the set snp \ (fb : b 2 obs g f a : a 2 act g).
A life-cycle over is a map : IN ! Snp . We denote by the set of all life-cycles over . For each i 2 IN and 2 we denote by i the pre x of length i of the sequence .
A life-structure over is a set such that, for each 2 , a 2 act and i 2 IN, a 2 i i there exists 0 2 with ] ] i =] 0 ] i , and i n r = 0 i n r such that ra 2 0 i .
Let be a life-cycle over . The satisfaction of formulae in Form by at each i 2 IN is inductively de ned as follows: j = i b i b 2 i ; j = i a i a 2 i ; j = i ra i ra 2 i ; j = i (: ') i not j = i '; j = i (' ) ) i j = i or not j = i '; j = i (X ') i j = i+1 '; j = i (' U ) i either, for some j i, j = j and for all i k < j, j = k ' or for every j i, j = j '.
We say that satis es a formula ' over , j = ', i j = i ' for every i 2 IN. We also say that satis es a set of formulae Form , j = , i j = ' for every ' 2 .
And we extend the de nition to life-structures. We say a life-structure over satis es a formula ', j = ', i j = ' for each 2 . Analogously, satis es a set of formulae , j = , i j = ' for each ' 2 .
Obviously, a life-structure can be seen as a set of life-trees, life-cycles corresponding to in nite paths in a tree. Enablings can therefore be derived, at each node of a tree, by looking for possible occurrences in alternative nodes.
The temporal logic we use is non-anchored (Manna and Pnueli, 1989) and is not equipped with a birth atom whose satisfaction is only held at 0. This is because we are interested in specifying overall properties of systems behaviour with no particular interest in initial constraints. Note, however, that adding it would bring no relevant technical problems throughout the remainder of the paper. Definition 2.6. (Speci cation and satisfaction) A speci cation is a pair spec = ( ; ?), where is a signature and ? Form is a nite set of formulae (usually referred to as axioms). A life-structure over satis es spec, j = spec, i j = ?.
Specification examples
It must be clear that, due to the de nition of snapshot, formulae of the form (ra) a) are always satis ed. It is also intended, as made clear by the de nition of life-structure, that the meaning of a is exactly that a can occur (i.e., enabling of a prime action is an observation whose value at each instant re ects its possible occurrence immediately after). We also require that the systems are open towards the environment. By this we mean that occurrences may be nitely delayed, in any life-cycle, in order to allow interleaving with life-cycles of other systems (Sernadas, Sernadas and Caleiro, 1996) . This shall mean that, in general, a formula like ra cannot be expected to hold.
We start by taking a brief look at some classes of formulae commonly used in systems speci cation (Manna and Pnueli, 1989) , (Manna and Pnueli, 1991) .
Example 2.7. (Speci able properties) Let '; be formulae with no temporal operators and a be a prime action symbol over the same signature. We note the ability to specify, for instance: safety: (G ') or simply ' 1 ; liveness: (' ) (F )); fairness:
justice: ((F(G a)) ) (G(F ra))); compassion: ((G(F a)) ) (G(F ra))); valuation: (ra ) (X')).
Example 2.8. (Activity) Suppose we wanted to specify an active system in the sense that it should not remain idle from a certain instant on unless, in fact, it has really no chance of evolving. I.e., we want to exclude from its allowed life-cycles all those where, from a certain instant on, nothing occurs despite there being enabled actions recurrently.
Let be such that act = fa 1 ; : : :; a k g.
In that case, the corresponding requirement could be speci ed by the axiom:
((G(F( a 1 _ : : : _ a k ))) ) (G(F(ra 1 _ : : : _ ra k )))).
Example 2.9. (Clock bomb) Suppose we wanted to specify the behaviour of a clock bomb system. The idea would be to have some internal clock doing \tic" until, sometime in the future, the bomb explodes. We could chose the speci cation to be clock bomb = ( clock bomb ; ? clock bomb ), with: clock bomb;obs = fong; clock bomb;act = ftic; bangg;
? clock bomb consisting of the following 6 axioms: 1 ( tic , on) 2 ( bang , on) 3 (:(rbang)) ) ((on , X on))) 4 (rbang ) (X(: on))) 5 (:(rbang^rtic)) 6 (on ) (F rbang)) Axioms 1 and 2 mean, respectively, that tic and bang are enabled i observation on is true. The third axiom ensures that the value of observation on can only be changed after a bang occurrence and axiom 4 requires that on is false after bang occurs. The fth axiom prevents tic and bang from occurring simultaneously and the last one requires that, once turned on, the clock bomb will eventually bang.
Consider the following life-cycles over clock bomb :
(i) such that 0 = fon; tic; bang; rticg, 1 = fon; tic; bang; rbangg, n = ; for every n > 1;
(ii) 0 such that 0 n = fon; tic; bang; rticg for every n < 50, 0 50 = fon; tic; bang; rbangg, 0 n = ; for every n > 50.
(iii) 00 such that 00 n = fon; tic; bang; rticg for every n 2 IN; Clearly, both and 0 satisfy clock bomb but 00 does not satisfy axiom 6. This is clearly a situation in which the liveness property speci ed by axiom 6 indicates that the speci er did not want to commit himself with the precise instant in which bang will occur. It is therefore making use of the inherent non-determinism on the satisfaction of eventualities as a form of underspeci cation. But eventualities are also used with di erent purposes. Consider, for instance, the following speci cation.
Example 2.10. (Mutual exclusion) Suppose we wanted to specify a protocol for maintaining mutual exclusion for two processes in the access to some critical section (CS). Each process cyclicly leaves a noncritical \idle" state becoming willing to enter the CS. Upon a certain time awaiting it must eventually enter and then leave the CS, again becoming \idle". Of course, the processes are not allowed to be at the CS at the same time. We could use the speci cation mutex = h mutex ; ? mutex i, with: mutex;obs = fidle 1 ; idle 2 ; critical 1 ; critical 2 g; mutex;act = fwilling 1 ; willing 2 ; in 1 ; in 2 ; out 1 ; out 2 g; ? mutex consisting of the following axioms 1 (idle 1 ) (: critical 1 )) 2 (idle 2 ) (: critical 2 )) 3 ( willing 1 , idle 1 ) 4 ( willing 2 , idle 2 ) 5 ( in 1 , ((: idle 1 )^(: critical 1 ))) 6 ( in 2 , ((: idle 2 )^(: critical 2 ))) 7 ( out 1 , critical 1 ) 8 ( out 2 , critical 2 ) 9 (rwilling 1 ) (X((: idle 1 )^(: critical 1 )))) 10 (rwilling 2 ) (X((: idle 2 )^(: critical 2 )))) 11 (rin 1 ) (Xcritical 1 )) 12 (rin 2 ) (Xcritical 2 )) 13 (rout 1 ) (X idle 1 )) 14 (rout 2 ) (X idle 2 )) 15 (((: rwilling 1 )^((: rin 1 )^(: rout 1 )))) (((X idle 1 ) , idle 1 )^((Xcritical 1 ) , critical 1 ))) 16 (((: rwilling 2 )^((: rin 2 )^(: rout 2 )))) (((X idle 2 ) , idle 2 )^((Xcritical 2 ) , critical 2 ))) 17 (rwilling 1 ) (F rout 1 )) 18 (rwilling 2 ) (F rout 2 )) 19 (:(critical 1^c ritical 2 )) Axioms 1 to 18 are paired and correspond to each of the processes separately. The rst two state that an idle process is not in the CS. Axioms 3 and 4 declare that a process can become willing to enter the CS i it is idle, and axioms 5 and 6 that a process can enter the CS i it is outside and not idle. The next two axioms say that a process can leave the CS i it is in there. Axioms 9 to 14 specify the e ect of action occurrences. Axioms 9 and 10 say that after becoming willing a process is neither idle nor in the CS, axioms 11 and 12 say that after entering a process is in the CS and axioms 13 and 14 ensure that after leaving the CS a process becomes idle. Axioms 15 and 16 express a frame rule saying that only actions can change observations. Axioms 17 and 18 express the fairness requirement for each of the processes: a process which becomes willing to enter the CS will eventually leave it. Axiom 19 is where the mutual exclusion is speci ed.
Which operational semantics?
If we adopted a class of labelled transition systems whose in nite computations were extracted by just requiring sequentiality, we would have no way of supporting, for instance, the satisfaction of fairness properties. One may want to specify systems where, to some of its actions no fairness is required or required only on certain situations. This is often achieved by taking a model whose acceptance condition involves some additional properties on the set of states visited in each computation, eg. B uchi, Muller or Streett automata (Thomas, 90) . However, for representing reactive systems it is usually more convenient to force these additional acceptance constraints on the basis of transitions rather than on states. It is the case of the fair transition systems used in (Manna and Pnueli, 1992) , (Manna and Pnueli, 1993) . For instance, if so speci ed, the treatment of fairness allows the exclusion of computations where a stuttering transition is persistently performed while other actions are enabled as shown in a previous example. Apart from all this, the operational domain we are looking for must also be such that the exact behaviour of a speci ed system may be synthesized from the speci cation and used as a prototype for execution. We also need a mandatory stuttering transition (for delays) in order to achieve, to a certain extent, the possibility of composing systems.
G-automata
The discussion above motivates the description of our operational semantics domain, chosen in order to provide the ability to cope with the speci cation of fairness and liveness properties, and synthesis from a given speci cation. The structure of G-automata is, essentially, that of labelled transition systems with stuttering. However, we additionally incorporate a set of goals to be achieved at each of its states and a goal ful lment mechanism to each of its transitions. By a state having a goal to be achieved we intuitively mean that the acceptable computations (sequences of transitions) from that state on must be only those which eventually include a transition ful lling it. That is, we incorporate the mechanism for satisfying eventualities into the acceptance condition of G-automata. (i) a signature of observation and prime action symbols; (ii) a set S of states; (iii) a set S 2 act S of transitions, such that for each e 2 2 act and s; r 2 S, hs; e; ri 2 means that there is a transition labelled by e from state s to state r; (iv) a state valuation map v : S ! 2 obs , assigning to each state its set of observations; (v) a set G of goals;
(vi) a pending goals map p : S ! 2 G , de ning the set of pending goals at each state; (vii) a ful lled goals map f : ! 2 G , mapping each transition onto the set of goals it ful ls such that the following conditions hold: open-nature: hs; ;; si 2 for each s 2 S; ful lment vs. pending goals: f(hs; e; ri) p(s) for each hs; e; ri 2 ; goal persistence: (p(s) n p(r)) f(hs; e; ri) for each hs; e; ri 2 .
As must be clear, transitions are labelled by sets of prime action symbols instead of being labelled with only one prime action symbol. This is due to our interest in having a semantic domain which is rich enough to support, for instance, parallel composition constructs. In that case, if action symbols are meant to synchronize, our choice turns to be quite natural. Thus, from now on, we shall refer to sets of prime action symbols just as \actions".
To explain the three conditions imposed on the de nition of G-automaton we have to assume a pragmatic point of view. In fact, since we consider an action to be a set of prime action symbols (meaning that all those prime actions occur from an instant in time to the following, performing a concurrent step), we have to decide what we mean by the ; action. We claim that it should be seen as an \invisible" change of state and that it can play the role of a stuttering transition. This choice is the key to the achievement of suitable support for hiding and interleaved parallel composition. Besides, the information introduced by the maps p and f concerning goals should be such that only pending goals are ful lled, and that every pending goal must propagate to subsequent states, at least until some transition indeed ful ls it.
Given a G-automaton, it is possible to infer which transitions leaving a certain state may help to the eventual achievement of a pending goal. The intuition is that a transition contributes to the achievement of the goal if it is the rst transition in a nite non-cyclic path of consecutive transitions leading to one which actually ful ls the goal.
In the sequel, each transition = hs; e; ri of a G-automaton shall be also referred to by s e ! r and we shall assume dom( ) = s, act( ) = e and cod( ) = r. Let aut = ( ; S; ; v; G; p; f) be a G-automaton. We say that 2 contributes to the achievement of g 2 p(s) i dom( ) = s and there exists a nite sequence of transitions 1 ::: n such that the following conditions are satis ed: sequentiality: dom( i+1 ) = cod( i ) for every i 2 f1; :::; n? 1g; initialization: 1 = ; inner-cycle absence: cod( i ) 6 = dom( ) for every i 2 f1; :::; n ? 1g and i 6 = j implies cod( i ) 6 = cod( j ) for every i; j 2 f1; :::; ng; achievement: g 2 f( n ).
We denote by Contrib( ) the set of pending goals at dom( ) to whose achievement contributes. In fact, if we regard the source of the homomorphism as a whole system and the target as a component, the condition requires that every transition of the whole system has a counterpart in terms of a corresponding transition of the component. The same intuition applies to the observational correspondence condition, since it states that any observation in a state of the whole system must be supported by the relevant observations in the corresponding state of the component. The pending goals and goal ful lment correspondence conditions force pending goals and goal ful lment performance of a component to extend to corresponding states and transitions of the whole.
To illustrate some of the potentialities of this semantic domain, we shall take a look at its ability to support simple parallel composition with preservation of the goal mechanisms of the parts involved. The parallel composition aut 0 k aut 00 of G-automata aut 0 = ( 0 ; S 0 ; 0 ; v 0 ; G 0 ; p 0 ; f 0 ) and aut 00 = ( 00 ; S 00 ; 00 ; v 00 ; G 00 ; p 00 ; f 00 ) is ( ; S; ; v; G; p; f), where:
(i) = ( 0 obs + 00 obs ; 0 act + 00 act ); (ii) S = S 0 S 00 ; (iii) = fhhs 0 ; s 00 i; e 0 + e 00 ; hr 0 ; r 00 ii : hs 0 ; e 0 ; r 0 i 2 0 ; hs 00 ; e 00 ; r 00 i 2 00 g; (iv) v(hs 0 ; s 00 i = v 0 (s 0 ) + v 00 (s 00 ) for every s 0 2 S 0 and s 00 2 S 00 ; (v) p(hs 0 ; s 00 i = p 0 (s 0 ) + p 00 (s 00 ) for every s 0 2 S 0 and s 00 2 S 00 ; (vi) (hhs 0 ; s 00 i; e 0 + e 00 ; hr 0 ; r 00 ii) = f 0 (hs 0 ; e 0 ; r 0 i) + f 00 (hs 00 ; e 00 ; r 00 i) for every (s 0 ; e 0 ; r 0 ) 2 0 and (s 00 ; e 00 ; r 00 ) 2 00 .
Note that + stands for the disjoint union and for the cartesian product of sets. Moreover, parallel composition is a product in the corresponding category 1 of G-automata (Caleiro, 1995) . v 00 (t) = ;; G 00 = fg 00 g; p 00 (t) = fg 00 g; f 00 (t fcg ! t) = fg 00 g, f 00 (t ; ! t) = ;. Introducing goals into transition systems was brought up as a way of restricting the usual notion of computation, imposing necessary ful lment of pending goals at ongoing states. Due to this fact we shall restrict our attention to goal-consistent G-automata i.e., G-automata where every pending goal can be ful lled.
If is the set of transitions of a G-automaton and s is one of its states, we denote by (s) the set f 2 : dom( ) = sg. The following result shows that goal-consistency is preserved by parallel composition. The parallel composition aut 0 k aut 00 of G-automata is goal-consistent if and only if both aut 0 and aut 00 are goal-consistent.
Computations and satisfaction
A computation of a G-automaton is, as usual, a sequence of consecutive transitions. However, it is possible that some of these sequences do not correspond to our intended idea of goal ful lment. In that case, we have to lter the undesired ones by imposing that pending goals are ful lled. Let us consider xed a G-automaton aut = ( ; S; ; v; G; p; f). We denote by Comp aut the set of all computations of aut.
The de nition of formula satisfaction by a G-automaton is similar to the above de ned satisfaction by life-cycle. Obviously, a life-cycle can be extracted from each computation of an automaton. Consequently, a life-structure can be extracted by considering the set of all life-cycles corresponding to its computations. The menu of a state is the set of actions whose occurrence is enabled in that state. We say that aut satis es ' 2 Form , aut j = ', i Lfs(aut) j = '. Analogously, aut satis es the set ? Form , aut j = ?, i aut j = ' for each ' 2 ?, and aut satis es a speci cation spec = ( ; ?), aut j = spec, i aut j = ?.
Synthesizing G-automata from speci cations
In this section we aim at presenting an algorithmic construction method for the operational semantics (suitable goal-consistent G-automaton) of a given speci cation over a nite signature ( nite sets of observation and prime action symbols). By suitable we mean not only that it must satisfy the speci cation but also that it must fully represent any other automaton satisfying the speci cation. I.e., the synthesized G-automaton must be in some sense canonical among all those G-automata which satisfy the speci cation. The synthesis algorithm presented capitalizes on the results in (Caleiro, 1993) and consists of an adapted version of the tableaux-based decision procedure for propositional temporal logic presented in (Ben-Ari, Pnueli and Manna, 1983) and, speci cally, of the synthesis method proposed in (Manna and Wolper, 1984) . We start by introducing the envisaged tableaux system (Bell and Machover, 1977) for the temporal logic we are using. Insight was also given by similar synthesis approaches for computation tree logics and producing tree automata (Clarke and Emerson, 1981) , (Pnueli and Rosner, 1988) .
Tableaux for temporal logic
A tableau is a nite tree whose nodes are labelled by sets of formulae. Given a set of tree formation (inference) rules we can build a tableau whose root node is any given nite set of formulae. The rules we are interested in are similar to those used both in (Ben-Ari, Pnueli and Manna, 1983) and (Manna and Wolper, 1984) and are based on the xed point properties of temporal operators. The idea behind them is to make the suitable requirements over the next instant in order to satisfy a formula at the present.
Definition 4.1. (Inference rules schemata, inference rules, premises, conclusion) Let ', be formulae. The inference rules schemata are: The above de ned inference rules schemata for the primary propositional logic connectives and temporal operators can be used to derive rules for those other logical connectives and temporal operators introduced by abbreviation in subsection 2.1. We get:
:' : We can now take a look at how inference rules are used to build tableaux. Let us rst introduce some useful notions. A branch of a nite tree to be any nite sequence of nodes 0 ; : : :; n such that 0 is the root of the tree, each i+1 is a successor of i , and n has no successors. We say n is the nal node of the branch. We also de ne a leaf of a nite tree to be the nal node of some of its branches. We say that a branch is contradictory if its nodes contain some formula ' and its negation (: '). Definition 4.2. (Tableaux) Let be a nite set of formulae over . The tree with only one node consisting of is a tableau for . If T is a tableau and the conclusion of an inference rule is in a branch of T then T 0 , the tree which results from adding nodes corresponding to each premise of the rule as successors of the nal node of the branch of T considered, is a tableau. We write T T 0 . An exhausted tableau for is a tableau for such that each of its branches is either contradictory or no further rules can be applied.
As a simpli cation, we assume that no rule is applied twice to the same formula in the same branch and that no rules are applied to contradictory branches. Note also that, by de nition, every tableau is a nite tree. 
n n n n n n n n n n n n n P P P P P P P P P P P
n n n n n n n n n n n n n P P P P P P P P P P P P (F) 8 n n n n n n n n n n n n n P P P P P P P P P P P P P ()) 4 n n n n n n n n n n n n n P P P P P P P P P P P P P From each parent node to its sons we mention the rule schemata which is being used and we number the formula to which it is being applied. The crosses denote contradictory branches. We conclude that the speci cation axioms plus the formulae on, rtic and (:rbang) can only hold if in the next instant on and (F rbang) hold. A life-cycle over satis es at i 2 IN the conclusion of an inference rule i it satis es all the formulae in some of its premises. A life-cycle over signature satis es at i 2 IN all the formulae in the root of a tableau i it satis es all the formulae in some of its branches.
As immediate corollaries we have that the root of a tableau is inconsistent (not satisable) if and only if all its branches are inconsistent. In particular, if all its branches are contradictory then its root is inconsistent.
The following result shows the existence of a procedure tableau which constructs an exhausted tableau given the set of formulae wanted in its root. Let be a nite set of formulae over . There is no in nite sequence fT i g i2IN of tableaux for s.t. T i T i+1 for every i 2 IN. Moreover, the set of tableaux for is nite and each of them can be e ectively computed.
The proof of the result above is straightforward, although dull, and can be done by induction on the structure of the formulae in .
We also consider available a procedure branches which takes a tableau as input and produces the set of sets of formulae corresponding to each of its non-contradictory branches. From now on we shall call branch to the set of all the formulae which occur in its nodes.
The synthesis algorithm
The set of inference rules we use is such that a tableau is a way of requiring (when necessary) that the \next state" conditions hold. We simply get to knowing which formulae must be satis ed in the next instant in order to satisfy the actual set at the present. This is the overall idea behind the synthesis method. It proceeds by checking which sets of formulae may characterize a state reachable from some other by the occurrence of a certain set of prime actions. The procedure shall, however, require that the working signature is nite i.e., that both the sets of observation and prime action symbols are nite. Let be such a signature. We introduce some auxiliary notation:
(i) if B obs , obs(B) = B f(:b) : b 2 ( obs n B)g; (ii) if e 2 2 act , (e) = f a : a 2 eg f(: a) : a 2 ( act n e)g; (iii) if e 2 2 act , r(e) = fra : a 2 eg f(: ra) : a 2 ( act n e)g;
Let us now consider xed a speci cation spec = ( ; ?) over the nite signature . For the sake of simplicity, we shall pre x the speci cation formulae with a G operator. This simpli es the method because we are using a oating version of temporal logic but a state by state reasoning. Anyway, it is easy to see that a life-cycle satis es a formula ' i satis es (G ') (remember that the logic is oating).
The synthesis method consists of ve steps. First, given the input speci cation, and by tableau constructions, we build a directed labelled graph with sets of formulae as nodes and actions as edge labels. We also obtain a candidate valuation map by looking at observations in each of the nodes.
Step two is a lter for non-open nodes. Our aim is to get a G-automaton, thus all the states must satisfy the open-nature condition. The graph obtained in step one is restricted to those nodes which have an empty-set edge to themselves. The valuation map is also restricted. The third step, also a ltering step, deals with our notion of enabling. A node establishes its enablings if for each prime action whose enabling atom is in the node, there exists an edge leaving it whose label contains that prime action. We get a yet more restricted graph containing only those nodes which establish their enablings, and corresponding edges. Once again we con ne the valuation map to the nodes left. Steps four and ve have to do with goals. In step four we build the set of goals and the pending goals and goal ful lment maps. This is done by analysis of \eventuality" formulae throughout the obtained graph. In step ve we check for goal-consistency of the states of the G-automaton obtained after step four.
Step 1 -Graph construction
To produce the underlying candidate graph of the claimed G-automaton we proceed by considering that, at each state, the set of axioms of the speci cation plus some set of enablings and observations must hold. Then, by applying a tableau construction to each such state on considering the execution of each of the allowed sets of prime actions and by looking at the X formulae appearing in each of its non-contradictory branches we build up new corresponding states. The set S 1 of state candidates is inductively de ned as follows:
(i) G(?) (e) obs(B) 2 S 1 for each e 2 2 act and B obs ; (ii) next( ) (e) obs(B) 2 S 1 for each e 2 2 act and B obs , if exist 2 S 1 and d fa : a 2 g such that 2 branches(tableau( r(d))).
This set S 1 is nite and can, hence, be e ectively computed. This can be proved by structural induction on the nite set of formulae of the speci cation by recalling that tableaux can be computed, and by using the fact that the possible X formulae in branches of tableaux and the signature are both nite. More speci cally, we can give an upper bound on the number of states of S 1 . Just note that its elements can only contain subformulae of the initial set of pre xed axioms G(?), observation and enabling atoms, and negations of those. Hence, since the set of axioms of the speci cation is nite, the number of subformulae of G(?) is also nite, say s. Moreover, the set of observation and enabling atoms has size o + e = j obs j + j act j. Therefore, there could be no more than 2(s + o + e) distinct formulae in each state and thus no more than 4 (s+o+e) states.
Each tableau construction then possibly gives rise to new candidate states corresponding to its non-contradictory branches. However, di erent branches may lead to the same state. We can associate with each \transition" = h ; d; next( ) (e) obs(B)i the union of all the formulae in all those branches. We call to this set the extension of . Let f? 1 ; : : :; ? n g = f? 2 branches(tableau( r(d))) : next(?) = next( )g. Then:
Ext( ) = ? 1 : : : ? n . Obviously S 1 and 1 give rise to a directed graph Graph 1 = (S 1 ; 1 ; dom; cod). We can already de ne the candidate state valuation map v 1 by: v 1 ( ) = act \ for each 2 S 1 .
As was pointed out in (Manna and Wolper, 1984 ) the construction of this graph consists of a search for all potential life-cycles satisfying the speci cation. That is, every life-cycle satisfying the formulae corresponds to some in nite path in the graph and every nite path in the graph generates a pre x of some life-cycle satisfying the speci cation.
4.2.2.
Step 2 -Open-nature checking Since we are not interested in obtaining a graph including every possible life-cycle satisfying the axioms but just those life-cycles corresponding to computations of potential G-automata we have to get rid of those which do not ful ll the open-nature condition. Thus, we exclude from the graph all the nodes computed in 4.2.1 which do not have an emptyset labelled transition to themselves.
The set S 2 of state candidates for which the open-nature condition holds is: S 2 = f 2 S 1 : h ; ;; i 2 1 g.
The 2 set of transitions is just the according subset of 1 : 2 = f 2 1 : dom( ); cod( ) 2 S 2 g.
The restricted graph obtained is Graph 2 = (S 2 ; 2 ; dom; cod). Analogously, the v 2 state valuation map is the restriction of v 1 to S 2 : v 2 ( ) = v 1 ( ) for each 2 S 2 .
Step 3 -Enabling checking
We now ensure that enablings in each state agree with the labels of its outgoing edges. The set T of open state candidates which do not establish their enablings is the least subset T of S 2 satisfying the condition: if there exist a 2 act and 2 S 2 s.t. a 2 and fcod( ) : 2 2 , dom( ) = , a 2 act( )g T then 2 T.
Note that since Graph 2 is nite this set can be e ectively calculated. We now de ne another approximating graph, Graph 3 = (S 3 ; 3 ; dom; cod), such that: (i) S 3 = S 2 nT; (ii) 3 = f 2 2 : dom( ), cod( ) 2 S 3 g; (iii) v 3 ( ) = v 2 ( ), for each 2 S 3 .
Step 4 -Goal construction
By now one may wonder if the life-cycles corresponding to \computations" of Graph 3 necessarily satisfy the speci cation. To answer this question we have to take a closer look at the nature of the formulae inside each state. A priori, the answer should be a rmative. That is exactly the intention of the tableaux method. However, a problem arises with a particular kind of formulae, usually referred to as eventualities. An eventuality formula is, exactly as its name suggests, a formula whose satisfaction at a certain i 2 IN can be postponed to i + 1. That is, a formula which eventually becomes true, but whose satisfaction may be attained as late as one wishes. By looking at the rules of our inference system (or alternatively to the de nition of formula satisfaction), it is easy to see that the basic constructors of eventualities are those formulae of the kind (: (' U )) which require the eventual satisfaction of (: '). So, in general, the answer to the question above is negative. In a state containing eventualities, it is possible that some computation starting there always performs transitions which delay their satisfaction. We therefore must get rid of such computations. This is the reason why we enriched the automata with a goal structure. Eventualities occurring in any of the candidate states give rise to pending goals which persist until some transition indeed ful ls them. If a state contains a formula of the referred kind, (: ') shall originate a goal, its ful lment by transitions being inferred from the structure of the corresponding tableaux. Due to disjunctions, we will have to consider each goal to be a set of formulae instead of a plain formula. Note also that, by abbreviation, the pattern (: (' U )) includes the usual \sometime in the future" formulae, (F ) (:((: ) U ( ^(: ))).
Example 4.6. (Satisfaction vs. eventualities) A speci cation including (: ') and (F ') is clearly unsatis able. However, a tableau for it has non-contradictory leaves, the problem being ever postponed.
To start with, we shall need a way of taking a closer look at the structure of states. This can be done by a tableau, which reduces each state to its more atomic constituents. Since by de nition of snapshot no prime action can occur without being enabled we just previously add the non-occurrence of every prime action which is not enabled at that state. The set of properties of 2 S 3 is Prop( ) = f(: ra) : (: a) 2 g and its set of consequences is Conseq( ) = branches(tableau(Prop( ))).
We now check for eventuality patterns in the consequences of each state. The unful lled ones shall be called \target" formulae. These will be the building blocks of the goals at each state. To motivate this, note that several alternative \target" formulae may occur in distinct branches and thus, recalling the soundness result for tableaux, it is enough to require the full satisfaction of the \targets" in just one of them. This leads us to requiring that their disjunction is true. In quite the same way, using the derived temporal operators, we would have a target formulae ' for patterns (F ') and a target formula (: ') for patterns (:(G ')).
We now de ne the set Goals( ) of pending goals at each 2 S 3 . For the purpose let: Note that we use to denote strict inclusion.
Definition 4.9. (Pending goals at ) Let 2 S 3 and g Targets( ). We say that g is a pending goal at , g 2 Goals( ), i (i) g 6 = ;; (ii) g \ targets(?) 6 = ; for every ? 2 Max( ); (iii) if ; 6 = g 0 g then, for some ? 2 Max( ), g 0 \ targets(?) = ;.
Intuitively, g intersects the targets of all the branches in the consequences of the state, but none of its subsets does. It is a minimum span of the set of targets with respect to the alternative maximal branches of Conseq( ).
Easily, one of the sets of relevant targets is accomplished i all the goals are satis ed.
We can now de ne the set G 3 of candidate goals and the pending goals map p 3 of the candidate G-automaton:
Goals( );
(ii) p 3 ( ) = Goals( ) for each 2 S 3 .
As far as goal ful lment is concerned, the obvious idea is that to satisfy a goal it su ces the satisfaction of one of its formulae (remember that goals as sets were introduced to deal with disjunctions). The satisfaction of formulae by a transition will be established by looking at the corresponding tableau and at the properties of the corresponding reached state.
Hence, for each transition 2 3 , the goal ful lment map f is de ned by g 2 f( ) i g 2 p(dom( )) and at least one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) g \ Ext( ) 6 = ;; (ii) branches(tableau(Prop(cod( )) f(: ') : ' 2 gg)) = ;.
The rst condition is equivalent to saying that some formula in the goal is satis ed by performing transition . The second condition holds if some formula in the goal is a consequence of the formulae in cod( ) i.e., the reached state. The same is to say that a transition ful ls a goal whenever some of its formulae is a consequence of the set of occurring prime actions and of the properties of its domain state or alternatively if some formula in the goal is a consequence of the properties of its codomain state.
Note that if we enrich the labelled graph structure Graph 3 with the set of goals G, the pending goals map p and the goal ful lment map f (obtained as described previously) we obtain a G-automaton.
4.2.5.
Step 5 -Goal-consistency checking (minimization)
The problem is now reduced to checking whether or not the obtained G-automaton is goal-consistent. This can be solved by calculating the reachability graph of each state with a pending goal and by checking if any of the transitions that ful l that goal is reachable. We use, of course, the previously de ned notion of contribution. We are, at this stage, able to de ne our envisaged operational semantics of a temporal speci cation as the G-automaton synthesized by performing the steps described above. And note that the semantics proposed is not only correct with respect to the speci cation (in the sense that its induced life-structure satis es the axioms) but it can also be proved to be representative, in a rather strong way, of the class of all G-automata satisfying the speci cation. It is canonical in the exact sense that, taking any other G-automaton satisfying the speci cation, its induced life-structure is a subset of the life-structure of its operational semantics. ' a, with a 2 act If for some state 2 S it was the case that a = 2 S then, necessarily, it would have to include (: a). The previous argument applies to this case and hence the state would have been rejected in step 1. Moreover, since the state was maintained after step 3 it establishes its enablings and a in particular.
Therefore we have that a 2 Menu( ). So, by de nition of Lfc( ) it is clear that a 2 Lfc( ) i and hence Lfc( ) j = i a;
' ra, with a 2 act In this case, clearly, S = ; which makes the result trivial. Note that every state candidate is obviously eliminated in step 1 because the empty action contradicts ra;
' (: ( U #)) By construction, dom( i ) satis es (: #) and either (: ) or (X((: ( U #)))).
In the rst case we are done. In the second case (: ) is a target and gives rise to goal(s). Hence the acceptance of the computation ensures its ful lment.
(ii) Let = hs; e; ri be a transition of aut. In order to prove the desired property it is enough to guarantee the existence of a transition 0 = hs 0 ; e; r 0 i of syn for which v aut (s) = v syn (s 0 ), v aut (r) = v syn (r 0 ), Menu aut (s) = Menu syn (s 0 ) and Menu aut (r) = Menu syn (r 0 ). For the purpose rst consider the candidate state 0 = G(?) Menu aut (s) obs(v aut (s)). If 0 is eliminated in step 2 then pick 1 such that h 0 ; ;; 1 i is obtained in step 1 by adding exactly the same observations and enablings. Repeatedly proceed in this manner until either some n is not eliminated or every possibility has been rejected (there are nitely many). Clearly this last case is not possible. It would mean that the state s of aut was incompatible with its mandatory stuttering transition. Hence, considering an appropriate branch of tableau( n r(e)) one gets the desired transition 0 precisely by choosing s 0 = n and r 0 = next( ) (Menu aut (r)) obs(v aut (r)). (iii) This an immediate consequence of the previous item. Clearly, no G-automaton satis es the speci cation, since Lfs(syn) = ;.
The proof of the rst statement of this proposition is a direct consequence of the tableaux constructions and of the essence behind the goal ful lment condition in the acceptance condition of G-automata computations.
The second result can be obtained by inductively observing that it cannot be the case that any of the relevant states and transitions are thrown away in any of the eliminating steps of the synthesis algorithm.
Let us just examplify the synthesis method by applying it to two concrete speci cations. We start by taking a look at the resulting operational semantics of the clock bomb system and then proceed to the G-automaton corresponding to the mutual exclusion protocol (both speci ed in subsection 2.2). The G-automaton synthesized from the mutex speci cation in 2.10 is represented by the diagram 
Executing G-automata
Obviously, any operational model is intended to capture some notion of \computa-tion". And the conceptual breakthrough from automata to execution is necessarily thin because of their intrinsic resemblance to a state machine. In fact, a synthesis step such as ours really corresponds to \building an executable program from a non-executable speci cation" (Wolper, 1987) . Therefore, we now turn our attention to the direct implementation of goal-consistent G-automata. If we manage to implement the acceptance condition of G-automata, and given that any speci cation over a nite signature can be thought of as being represented by a G-automaton (as shown in the previous section), any reasonable implementation of the synthesized G-automaton can be seen as a way of prototyping the speci ed system. Furthermore, by choosing such an approach to executing temporal logic speci cations we do not have to assume any, a priori, strategy for implementing any desired fairness or liveness property. It is the way we choose to implement the acceptance condition of G-automata that must guarantee that all the speci ed properties are satis ed.
Moreover, since executing a speci cation is no more than building a model of its axioms (Fisher and Owens, 1995) , and due to the correctness of the synthesized Gautomaton with respect to the initial speci cation, any implementation strategy can be chosen provided that it is fair enough as to ensure that every pending goal at a certain step of the execution of a G-automaton is indeed ful lled in some future time. Every possible life-cycle satisfying the given speci cation is represented in its synthesized G-automaton and therefore any of them may be the one resulting from execution, depending on the way the goal ful lling strategy and also the inherent non-determinism of G-automata are implemented. This is the main di erence with the respect, for instance, to the \declarative past, imperative future" paradigm of executing temporal logic speci cations (Fisher and Owens, 1992) . In fact, the strategy followed by its application to MetateM (Barringer, Fisher, Gabbay, Gough and Owens, 1989) can obviously be seen as the search for a path in its corresponding automaton. But, of course, without knowing its complete structure, and even possibly having to unwind previous choices.
This happens because by executing G-automata we are not anymore concerned with consistency. The only remaining problem is the correct scheduling of goal ful lment. The unpleasant situation when there is no model for the speci cation is immediately thrown away by the synthesis method. And there is also no way an intermediate decision during the execution step may lead to a dead end. All of these are clearly excluded from executing goal-consistent G-automata. Even if a performed transition did not help ful lling a goal, we do always have a way of reaching its ful lment by continuing its execution from the reached state. This avoids the use of backtracking strategies which is, of course, very convenient in the case of an interactive prototyping environment as suggested in (Fisher and Owens, 1992) .
This main advantage is a direct consequence of a compiling instead of interpreting approach to programming languages. Consistency errors can be found at compilation time. While, of course, interpreting an inconsistent theory may lead to unexpected run time errors. The step of synthesis can therefore be seen as a compilation (as opposed to interpretation as in MetateM). The synthesized G-automaton plays the role of the abstract machine code generated by the compilation. And note that several runs of the same system can then be tried without further analysis of the speci cation since the Gautomaton is synthesized once and for all. Another usual advantage of compiling resides in the possibility of composing programs. This will be brie y discussed in the conclusions, namely with respect to parallel composition.
But compiling also has its disadvantages. Namely because it is clear that interpretation is much more convenient for incremental speci cation and debugging. Now returning to the central problem of implementing G-automata, the \unique" difference with respect to the implementation of classical automata is clearly the additional requirement on their acceptance condition. In other terms, we face the problem of choosing a general strategy for implementing eventualities. Of course, we may wonder if such a general method exists. We could simply transmit a report of the current pending goals and the menu of possible transitions and expect a human to take a wise choice. This would not, however, guarantee acceptance. On the other hand, it is easy to see that it will su ce to queue pending goals and always choose a transition which may help to ful l the oldest goal in the queue. Since the G-automata we are interested in are nite and goalconsistent this can be shown to be enough. In what concerns possible non-determinism we may assume a randomized choice is taken.
We should not, nevertheless, neglect the possibility of prototyping the speci ed systems in an interactive environment. I.e., it would be desirable to allow external signals on actions have their counterpart in terms of the strategy for choosing the transition to be executed. With an approach such as ours, this can be easily done, without further constraints, by restricting the choice in each step to transitions whose occurrence maximizes the set of actions signaled by the environment. The choice would therefore be only among those actions which, besides being chosen in order to contribute to the ful lment of the oldest pending goal (if any), ensure the occurrence of the greatest possible number of signaled actions. By doing so, of course, external signal on actions my have to wait for their execution.
Obviously, the case when the set of states of the G-automaton is empty need not be considered. As far as synthesized automata are concerned, proposition 4.11 guarantees that this only happens in case the given speci cation is inconsistent. The result is immediate since any goal in the head of queue is indeed ful lled (the existence of a suitable transition is ensured by the fact that the G-automaton is goalconsistent and by the inner-cycle absence condition in the de nition of contribution). Even in a state with no pending goals the open-nature conditions guarantees the existence of at least one transition leaving the state. All the rest is a consequence of the order imposed by the queueing mechanism and is of course independent of the randomized choice being used. Furthermore, in each step, the chosen transition executes as much externally signaled actions as possible.
Note that, in order to execute a speci cation, the initial state may be chosen according to a given input set of state constraints (eg. a condition on the values of observations, provided it is consistent with the speci cation). Let spec = h ; ?i be a speci cation over a nite signature and assume that syn, the Gautomaton synthesized from spec, has a non-empty set of states. Then, : IN ! , the sequence of transitions of syn generated by its interactive execution is such that Lfc( ) satis es spec.
This result is clearly a corollary of both the correctness of the operational semantics and the previous proposition.
Let us now take a close look at two meaningful examples. Precisely the clock bomb system and the mutual exclusion protocol previously presented.
Example 5.4. (Executing clock bomb) Recall the speci cation of the clock bomb system 2.9 and its operational semantics 4.12. Clearly, the only interesting initial state choice is i (eg. by requiring the constraint on).
According to the outlined strategy, the unique goal frbangg is queued. Thus, immediately in the rst step of the loop, the only possible transition contributing to the ful lment of the goal is exactly hi; frbangg; oi. So, life-cycle obtained from the execution is such that: 0 = fon; tic; bang; rbangg, n = ; for every n > 0.
The strategy was clearly too strict and, of course, the non-determinism on the occurrence of bang was merely implemented as if it had been speci ed (Xrbang). And note that external signals requiring the occurrence of tic would not help. But, of course, the obtained life-cycle matches the speci cation.
Example 5.5. (Executing mutex) Recall the speci cation of the mutual exclusion protocol 2.10 and its operational semantics 4.13. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that the initial state choice is a (eg. by requiring (idle 1^i dle 2 )). According to the outlined strategy, since there are no pending goals, it is possible, for instance, that always the stuttering transition on state a is performed. Let us suppose, however, that there were always persistent external stimuli for both willing 1 and willing 2 . In that case, clearly, the rst transition chosen leads to state f. Therefore, both g 1 and g 2 become pending. Without loss of generality let us assume priority is given to g 1 . Clearly, the transition contributing to achieving g 1 is 16 . We are then at state g and for ful lling g 1 two choices can be taken. Both moving to states c (by 18 ) and e (by 19 ) can be considered. Let us now suppose 19 is taken. The goal g 1 is ful lled and process 2 imediately enters the CS. The subsequent step is therefore ful lling g 2 by moving to b by transition 14 hence responding to the external signal for willing 1 . After that, again state g is visited and so forth. In this case, the corresponding life-cycle is such that: Clearly, the strategy schedules the two processes correctly. Of course the order is maintained, always the rst process is chosen, but only because we assumed that was the non-deterministic choice.
Note that eventualities may re ect two kinds of intentions from the speci er view point. Either guaranteeing response requirements or merely requiring non-determinism on the moment of ful lment (implicit versus intended non-determinism). The clock bomb example is clearly in the latest case. The eventuality is used as a means of underspeci cation since the system speci ed is not fully known. And obviously the computation given by executing it is for sure not the most pleasant. Similar problems arise, however, in other approaches to executing temporal logic programs (Abadi and Manna, 1989) , (Fisher and Owens, 1992) .
Conclusion and outlook
We have shown how to synthesize a representative canonical G-automaton satisfying a temporal logic speci cation. Namely, we have managed to derive liveness goals from a speci cation, hence being able to go beyond simply dealing with safety properties. Having obtained a way of associating an operational counterpart, in a suitable domain, to each system speci cation, several extensions to this work can now be considered. First of all, a full study of the compositionality properties of G-automata and of the connection between these constructs and the speci cation logic is required. The obvious step should be the study of the associated institution and its relationship to the corresponding denotational semantics (Sernadas, Sernadas and Caleiro, 1996) . A rst attempt in this direction can be found in (Caleiro, 1995) .
A deeper study of the power and nature of the acceptance condition of G-automata is necessary. However, we are already able to compare it with the classical Muller automata on in nite objects (Thomas, 1990) . B uchi automata are not suitable to our purposes since their acceptance condition is based on passing in nitely often in one of a number of nal states, which does not t our need for stuttering (the persistent performance of the stuttering transition at an accepting state would be accepted but could, in general, be unaware of goal ful lment). With respect to Muller automata we can say that Gautomata are not less powerful i.e., that a G-automaton can be build out of a Muller automaton both accepting exactly the same computations. Muller automata acceptance condition is that the set of states visited in nitely often is one of a number of sets of states (called frequent sets). This is done by replication of the original state/transition structure through each frequent set and introduction of a persistent goal, in each of the replications, corresponding to each of its states, whose ful lment is attained exactly by the transitions reaching that state. The acceptance condition of G-automata seems, however, more intuitive since it has to do with transitions rather than with states. At each step, each transition performed may be \helping" the computation to be accepted. This seems much more natural and feasible than being sure that in the end an exact set of states was visited in nitely often.
It is clear that the G-automata framework is suitable as a means of implementing prototypes of temporal systems speci cations. However, the di culties remain on the goal structure of the automaton. Several possibilities can be considered concerning the way eventualities are ful lled. The study and implementation of the strategy proposed and others are a further possible extension of the present work. An interesting line of reserach would be considering some kind of probabilistic automata (Pnueli, 1983) , (Segala, 1995) . By doing that we also make possible a probabilistic study of the correctness of implementation strategies and open the door to the use of probabilistic temporal logic (Hart and Sharir, 1984) .
Another important subject is the study of compositionality results. The fact that a system speci cation can be compiled into a G-automaton may be very interestingly used together with, for instance, a parallel composition primitive in order to implement interconnections of concurrent systems. The framework can therefore be rather compositional and therefore used for prototyping concurrent systems (Fisher and Barringer, 1991) , (Merz, 1992) , (Fisher and Wooldridge, 1993) .
A severe drawback is that the ideas presented cannot be fully applied to rst-order temporal logic (since it is incomplete). But, as pointed out by several authors, propositional temporal logic is enough in many concrete applications (Manna and Wolper, 1984) , (Emerson, 1990) .
A direct application of the presented techniques is their use for monitoring systems with respect to a given temporal speci cation. Monitoring of temporal logic constraints is a way to ensure dynamic integrity for example in the database area (Chomicki, 1992) , (Kung, 1984) , (Lipeck, 1990) , (Lipeck, Gertz and Saake, 1994) , (Lipeck and Saake, 1987) or in object systems (Schwiderski, Hartmann and Saake, 1994) . In (H ulsmann and Saake, 1991) , (Lipeck and Saake, 1987) , (Saake, 1991) , (Schwiderski, Hartmann and Saake, 1994) a special kind of automaton, called transition graph, is constructed from temporal logic constraints to be used for monitoring dynamic integrity in databases. Compared to Gautomata, transition graphs take no advantage of explicit goals such only distinguishing the situations \no pending goals", \pending goals which are satis able" and \inconsistent set of pending goals". Furthermore, satisfaction of the speci cation can only be de ned for nite system runs. Compared to this work, G-automata enable a di erentiated measure of the satisfaction of a temporal speci cation because the goals are made explicit. We can, for instance, use a preference relation between goal sets to distinguish system states which are \better" in satisfying a certain speci cation than others. During runtime, the process of system monitoring enables decisions about plans for satisfying more goals depending on the current state. This also allows for coordination of systems behaviour based on a temporal speci cation without having to generate the complete system from scratch.
